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So You Want a Nevada Divorce?
By GRAHAM SUSMAN*
Bill Jones' was miserable. For six years he had been separated
from his wife, and for some years prior to their separation, their marital
relationship was far from satisfactory. Constant arguments, fighting,
bickering, nagging and numerous embarrassing situations demonstrated
that the parties were definitely unsuited to each other. But for some
reason, Mrs. Jones wouldn't divorce Bill, nor would she give him the
satisfaction of obtaining a divorce. He .had filed a suit for divorce in
Colorado, and she had filed a cross-complaint for separate maintenance.
The jury had found both parties guilty of cruelty and decreed separate
maintenance to the wife under the authority of Vigil v. Vigil.'
Thereafter, a second suit was filed in Colorado by Jones based on
acts of cruelty occurring since the first trial, which resulted in the denial
of a divorce. It appeared that Bill Jones was destined to remain under
a rather intolerable situation, which became aggravated at the end of
each month, when another payment for his wife was mailed to the
clerk of the district court.
Mrs. Jones was assured of an income for the rest of her life--or for
the rest of his. She had stated in no uncertain terms that she would never
permit Bill to obtain a divorce and that she would fight him "until Hell
freezes." Of course she had no intention of getting a divorce, because if
her husband should remarry, it might affect his ability to continue those
monthly checks.
Jones had been reading the newspapers and had noticed the ease
with which many people severed their marital bonds by a short sojourn
in Nevada. His friends had urged him to go to Reno, where "he could
get a divorce in six weeks." Bill's mind was made up. He would go to
Nevada, bring an end to this marital conflict, and perhaps find some
happiness during the remaining years of his life. Perhaps he had better
*Member of the Denver bar.
1Any similarity in name of persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
49 Colo. 156, 111 Pac. 833 (1910), 31 L. R. A. (NS) 579 (1911).
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see his attorney, Mr. Barrister,a and discuss this step with him before he
left Colorado.
The next day Bill appeared at the office of his attorney. "Mr. Bar-
rister," he said, "I thought I'd let you know that I'm going to Nevada
and get a divorce there. Before going, I should like to ask you some
questions that have occurred to me."
"Certainly," replied the attorney. "I'd be glad to discuss this with
you. I suppose you know that there is some question as to whether or
not the Nevada decree would be recognized in Colorado."
"But," interrupted Jones, "here is a clipping I cut out of the paper
about a year ago, which says that the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that Nevada divorces must be recognized everywhere under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. It gives the name of the
case: Williams v. North Carolina."
'
-
"That case doesn't decide that," replied Barrister. "When the deci-
sion was first handed down, newspaper reports conveyed the impression
to the public that all Nevada decrees will be valid everywhere, and must
be recognized by the courts of every other state. This impression is not
correct."
"The Williams case," continued Barrister, "in effect, eliminated
the fiction of law known as 'matrimonial domicile.' In other words, the
Court has said that the forum need no longer inquire into the question of
which party is at fault to determine whether or not the matrimonial
domicile has been brought within the state. However, it did not decide
whether a sister state could inquire into the question of whether or not
there had been a bona fide domicile in Nevada. This question was not
raised in the Williams case, and the Court proceeded on the theory -that
the parties had acquired a permanent abode in Nevada. The Court spe-
cifically said:
"Nor do we reach the question as to the power of North Caro-
lina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees be-
cause, contrary to the findings of the Nevada Court, North Carolina
finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada."
The attorney continued: "As a matter of fact, there have been
many decisions which have specifically passed upon this point since the
ruling in the Williams case. Within a month after the Williams decision,
the supreme court of New York had this very question before it. In the
case of Jiranek u..Jiraneh,5 the husband went to Nevada, stayed there
'See note 1.
'317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 189 (1942), 143 A. L. R. 1273
(1943).
539 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 523 (Decided Jan. 22, 1943).
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the required six weeks and obtained a decree in his favor on the ground
of cruelty. In an action brought by his wife in New York, the record
of the Nevada court was introduced as a defense to the action. The
court said:
-When a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in
another, want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject
matter is open to inquiry * * * The nature of the federal union
of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sover-
eignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause of the
federal constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 1, to compel one state to subordi-
nate its own laws and policy concerning its domestic affairs to the
laws and policy of other states. * * * The United States Supreme
Court did not hold in Williams v. North Carolina that the bona
fides of the residence or domicile in Nevada of the plaintiff in the
Nevada action could not be challenged in this state because of the
full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.
"This principle of law has been followed by later decisions of the
New York courts,6 as well as in the states of Pennsylvania, 7 Ohio,8 New
Jersey,9 Connecticut,' ° and Massachusetts," but the decree of a foreign
state has been upheld in Illinois12 and Iowa.'1 And while there are no
Colorado decisions on this identical point of law since the Williams case,
supra, I am inclined to believe that the Colorado courts would follow
the weight of authority as exemplified by the New York decisions.
14
6McKee v. McKee, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 859 (Decided Feb. 20, 1943) ; In re
Bingham's Will, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 756 (Decided Feb. 1. 1943) ; Oberlander v.
Oberlander, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 139 (Decided Jan. 12, 1943) ; Beitch v. Beitch, 43
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 391 (Decided Mar. 16, 1943) ; In re Lindgren's Estate, 43 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 143 (Decided June 29, 1943) ; Jolby v. Jolby, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
855 (Decided June 23, 1943); Buvinger v. Buvinger, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 848
(Decided June 7, 1943) ; Fondiller v. Fondiller, 42 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 477 (Decided
Apr. 22, 1943) ; Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 45 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 654 (Decided
Dec. 13, 1943) ; and many other New York cases to the same effect. But see In re
Fine's Estate, 44 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 62 (Decided Sept. 29, 1943), where the decree
was upheld.
'Commonwealth v. Esenwein, 153 Pa. Superior 69, 33 At. (2d) 675 (Decided
July 16, 1943), where the court said: "Were it not for the misleading press notices
and the generally confused discussion of the Williams case. * * * it would scarcely be
necessary to point out the limited effect of this decision."
'Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N. E. (2d) 889 (1943).
8Mascola v Mascola, 134 N. J. Eq. 48, 33 At. (2d) 864 (Decided Sept. 17,
1943) ; Wolff v. Wolff, 134 N. J. Eq. 8. 34 Al. (2d) 150 (Decided Oct. 4, 1943).
"Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41, 32 At. (2d) 68 (Decided Apr. 20, 1943).
UBowditch v. Bowditch, 314 Mass. 410, 50 N. E. (2d) 65 (Decided July 13,
1943).
'Stephens v. Stephens. 319 I1. App. 292, 49 N. E. (2d) 560 (Decided Apr. 28,
1943).
'Hobson v. Dempsey, 7 N. W. (2d) 896 (Decided Feb. 16, 1943).
"4 Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921).
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"And it may interest you to know," said Barrister, "that the
Williams case was sent back to the North Carolina court for further
proceedings. That court has just sustained the conviction upon which
the original appeal was based,- and the North Carolina court specifically
held that it may inquire into the bona fides of the residence. This is the
language of the second opinion in that case:
"Where one's domicile is, there will his marital status be also.
The marital relation is interwoven with the public policy to such
an extent that it is dissolvable only by the law of the domicile. So
the domiciliary state, and no other, furnishes the proper forum for
valid divorce proceedings.' '16
"But my wife said she would fight me until Hell freezes over,"
said Jones, "and she would no doubt go to Nevada to contest the action.
I understand that most of the decisions you just mentioned were those
where one party went to Nevada and obtained service on the other by
publication, or by personal service in the state of defendant's residence.
Would it make any difference if my wife came to Nevada to contest the
action there?"
"Most assuredly, it would," replied Barrister. "Even if she were
to appear specially for the purpose of attacking the jurisdiction only,
your Nevada divorce, if one were subsequently entered, would be good
anywhere. This was decided by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Davis v. Davis,1 7 decided in 1938. There a resident of the Dis-
trict of Columbia moved across the Potomac and established his residence
in Virginia. After the required residence period, he filed suit for divorce
and his wife entered a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction. This
contest having been held adversely to her, she refused to proceed further
in the case, and a decree was entered in favor of the husband. In con-
testing the validity of the decree in the District of Columbia, the Supreme
Court upheld it, saying:
"She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for a divorce
in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in issue
his allegations as to domicile, introduced evidence to prove it false,
etc. * * * Plainly, the determination of the decree upon that point
is effective for all purposes in this litigation."
Barrister continued: "A recent New York decision is to the same
effect. 8 This case held that when a wife sued for divorce in Nevada,
'Williams v. North Carolina, 223 N. C. Supp. 141, 29 S. E. (2d) Adv. Sh. 744
(1944).
"SeeBellv. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551, 45 L. ed. 804 (1901).
'305 U. S. 32, 83 L. ed. 26, 59 Sup. Ct. 3.
'In re Adams Estate, 45 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 494 (Decided Dec. 16, 1943).
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and the husband residing in New York entered a voluntary appearance
in the Nevada court, the divorce decree would be recognized as valid in
New York, and the court cited numerous decisions in support of this
holding. In view of these holdings, it might be well if you could get
your wife to go to Nevada to attack the validity of your domicile
there.""9
"But," persisted Jones, "there is something else that bothers me."
"What is that?" replied the attorney.
"Well, you know, I was licked in two trials in Colorado, and I
haven't any new evidence other than that which was presented here. If
we go to Nevada, it will be necessary that we present the same evidence.
Isn't there some principle of law which bars the use of this evidence, once
the case has been adjudicated?"
"Not at all," promptly responded the attorney. "That point has
been adjudicated several times by the Nevada supreme court. Let us
suppose, for instance, that you bring an action on the ground that you
and your wife have lived separate and apart for more than three years
without cohabitation, 20 which gives the court discretion to grant a di-
vorce, and your wife defended on the grounds of cruelty, desertion, non-
support, and res adjudicata. The action would come squarely within the




"In the Herrick case, the wife defended on the grounds of cruelty,
desertion, and the fact that the case had been tried three times in the
California courts, in two of which the court had found both parties
guilty of cruelty. A divorce granted to the husband was upheld by the
Nevada supreme court. The court said:
"The idea of a divorce on the ground stated is an idea of recent
origin. The legislative concept embodied in the statute is that
when the conduct of parties in living apart over a long lapse of time
without cohabitation has made it probable that they cannot live
together in happiness, the best interests of the parties and of the
state will be promoted by a divorce. * * * This is a comparatively
new idea in the law of domestic relations and divorce.
"9See also Durlacher v. Durlacher, 35 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Nev. 1940), where the
court said: "The law appears to be well settled that where a defendant enters a special
appearance in a case prosecuted in a state other than that of his residence for the pur-
pose solely of raising a question of jurisdiction, and the decision is adverse to such
contention, and no appeal therefrom is taken, the question of jurisdiction becomes res
adjudicata, and cannot as to such action again be litigated."
mNFv. COMP. LAWS 1929, Supp. 1931-1941, §9467.06.
'55 Nev. 59,25 Pac. (2d) 378 (1933).
'56Nev. 12, 41 Pat. (2d) 1059, 97 A. L. R. 983 (1935).
'55 Nev. 201, 29 Pac. (2d) 351 (1934).
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"In other words, the granting of a divorce under this statute
does not depend upon the previous conduct of the petitioning
party. It is easy to conceive that the trial court under the circum-
stances of some particular case, might find it for the best interests
of both parties and of society that a divorce should be decreed irre-
spective of the earlier behavior of the petitioner.
"* * * It is unnecessary for us to determine if in any of the
California decrees the husband is adjudged to have been to blame
in causing the separation, and therefore estopped to maintain the
suit for divorce as contended by appellant. This contention is dis-
posed of by our ruling that it is not an essential element of the
statute that a party be without fault to maintain an action for
divorce on the ground of separation for five 24 years without cohabi-
tion."
Barrister continued: "In the George case, 25 the wife defended by
showing a decree obtained in Ohio declaring her husband to be guilty
of cruelty and awarding her separate maintenance. The court made an
interesting social observation in this case when it said:
"It is evident that the conjugal life and the family life of the
parties are permanently disrupted. There is no inclination for and
no prospect of a reconciliation. Nothing is left of the marriage
relation but the legal tie. Respondent contends that, regardless of
these facts, petitioner should be punished for his misconduct by a
refusal of the trial justice to dissolve the marriage. If it appeared
that there was any advantage to the family, or to the state in
continuing the marital status, the divorce might well be denied.
But no such advantage is apparent. On the contrary, it is plain
that to compel the parties to continue in their present status would
be prejudicial to the parties and to their children. Such being the
situation, we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of judicial
discretion by the trial justice in granting the petitioner's prayer for
divorce.
"From these quotations, it is clear that the discretion which
the trial court is called upon to exercise depends not so much upon
the comparative rectitude of conduct of the spouses as upon the
probability of their being able to live together in such a manner
as to be for their best interest and the best interest of society. * * *
"In the Jeffers case 26 the wife set up four affirmative defenses, but
the lower court overruled them and was sustained. The court held that
the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of the husband's faulty




conduct only for the purpose of influencing the discretion of the court
by the statute.
"The point is," added Barrister, "that the more evidence the wife
introduces as to the guilty conduct of her husband, the more likely the
court would be influenced in its discretion to grant a divorce, because
such evidence would demonstrate to the court that the parties should
not be bound to each other in marriage, and that a divorce should be
granted."
27
"Well, that sounds fine," said Jones, "but there is one other matter
that occurs to me. Suppose my wife doesn't want to go to Nevada, and
decides she wants to take some steps in Colorado to prevent me from
proceeding in Nevada? Could she do this?"
"There are a number of decisions which hold that courts have a
right to enjoin an absent spouse from proceeding with an action for di-
vorce in a foreign state," answered the attorney. "Of course, the local
court does not attempt to interfere directly with the courts of a sister
state, but acts in personam upon the spouse herself. There are three
principal reasons why courts of equity will issue such an injunction:
the foreign residence is not-bona fide and is obtained for the purpose of
the divorce only, which is in fraud of the foreign court and the deserted
spouse; it is an attempt to evade the laws of their common domicile;
and it would result in expense, inconvenience and hardship to cause the
deserted spouse to travel to Nevada to defend the action there.
"One of the leading cases on this subject is Usen v. Usen,2s where
the court said:
"Since the courts of this state alone can dissolve a marriage of
its citizens dwelling within its borders, it follows that a divorce
proceeding brought by one of its citizens against another, in a
sister state, is contrary to law, and so an. infringement not only on
the rights of the spouse who has been sued, but also an infringe-
ment on the right of the state to determine the matrimonial status
of its own citizens."
"The Williams case," continued the lawyer, "has raised an inter-
esting question even on this subject. The New York courts had refused
to issue an injunction to restrain an absent spouse from obtaining a for-
eign divorce29 on the ground that the plaintiff in the equity suit had
'See also Parks v. Parks, 116 Fed. (2d) 556 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1940), and
Bassett v. Bassett, 51 Fed. Supp. 545 (D. Nev. 1943).
"136 Me. 480, 13 Atl. (2d) 738, 128 A. L. R. 1449 (1940), and an exten-
sive annotation in 128 A. L. R. 1467. See also Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq.
94, 43 At. 97 (1899). a/f. 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Ad. 625 (1902), 58 L. R. A.
484 (1903).
'Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940).
nothing to fear, since under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock,"30 the
courts of the foreign state had no jurisdiction to render a valid decree
against plaintiff, and therefore that judgment would be a nullity. Then
the Williams case expressly overruled the Haddock case. Would the New
York courts still follow this earlier decision? This point seems to be
clarified by a recent New York decision ' which granted an injunction to
restrain the absent spouse where he had not even commenced an action,
but merely threatened to do so. The court said:
"Inasmuch as the Williams case has overruled the jurisdic-
tional principles laid down in the Haddock case, the threatened
injury is no longer illusory. Equity may fashion its remedy to
guard against the reality of harm."
"I understood you to say," interrupted Jones, "that the court acts
in personam, so that I would have to be served with the injunction-
or at 'east notice of it. Now, if I'm in Ncvada. how could the Colorado
court have power to serve me with an injunction order outside this state?
And even if they did, I understand that a personam order is not effective
unless served on m? within the borders of this state."
"That may have been the law at one time," replied the attorney,
"but not now. While it is true that service must be obtained, it seems
that state boundary lines have been practically dissolved for this purpose
by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 32 This was a
case that went up from Colorado, 3 3 where our supreme court held void
a Iudgment in personam obtained in Wyoming on service in Colorado.
The Suprcme Court of the United States reversed the case, and used this
language:
* * * The authority of a state over one of its citizens is not
terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state
which accords h~m privileges and affords protection to him and his
Frcperty by virtue of his domicile may also exact reci-irocal duties.
"* * * The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the
re'ationship to the state which domicile creates. That rela'ionship
is rot dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant
dut'es, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not
d~pendent upon continuous presence in the state. One such inci-
dent of dom'cile is amenability to suit within th? state even during
sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and em-
23201 U. s. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906).
3'Oltarfh v. Oltarsh, 43 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 901 (Decided Sept. 7. 1943).
'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 85 L. ed. 278, 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 132 A. L. R.
1357 (1941).
'Meyer v. Milliken. 101 Colo. 564. 76 Pac. (2d) 420 (1938), and Meyer v.
Milliken, 105 Colo. 532, 100 Pac. (2d) 151 (1940).
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ployed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of
the proceedings against him. * * *"
Barrister continued: "Even before the decision in the Millihen U.
Meyer case, many courts upheld the right to restrain an absent spouse,
based upon service outside the state, on the ground that a suit for an
injunction aimed to preserve a status in the state is a proceeding in rem,
even though it operates upon the person of the absent resident. 4  It
would appear, therefore, that service of a Colorado restraining order on
you in Nevada, would be effective and may subject you to a contempt
proceeding in Colorado, if you persist in proceeding with the suit in that
state, and then return to Colorado to resume your residence here.
"Well," continued Barrister, "is there anything else you'd like to
ask about?"
"No," replied Jones, "I've heard enough."
'Kempson v. Kempson, supra note 28; Knapp v. Knapp, 12 N. J. Misc. 599,
173 Atl. 343 (1934). See also annotation in 128 A. L. R. 1467, 1477 (1940).
